In a foundational and often cited work Blackwell and Dubins (1962) show that convergence will obtain if agents' priors are absolutely continuous. More precisely, if the probability measures P and Q over infinite sequences represent the agents' priors and Q is absolutely continuous with respect to P -meaning that QE > 0 implies PE > 0 for all events E in the sequence space-then with Q probability one, the conditional distributions of P and Q on the future given the past (as defined within) will converge under the usual distance metric for measures.
Suppose two agents are watching a sequence of numbers unfold over time. Each begins with a prior belief over the full sequence and then updates her beliefs on the future course of the sequence as each successive coordinate is revealed. Under what conditions will the agents' posteriors on the future of the sequence converge?
In a foundational and often cited work Blackwell and Dubins (1962) show that convergence will obtain if agents' priors are absolutely continuous. More precisely, if the probability measures P and Q over infinite sequences represent the agents' priors and Q is absolutely continuous with respect to P -meaning that QE > 0 implies PE > 0 for all events E in the sequence space-then with Q probability one, the conditional distributions of P and Q on the future given the past (as defined within) will converge under the usual distance metric for measures.
More recently, Kalai and Lehrer (1993) apply this result to construct the currently preeminent model in which learning leads to Nash equilibrium. There, Blackwell and Dubins' convergence result shows that players in an infinitely repeated game will eventually "learn" to frequency of ones in the Bernoulli trials will converge to $ + s, while P , who thinks it must converge to \, regards this as impossible.
This same idea can be restated in terms of the betting discussed above. Q always thinks it s -more likely than P that the next element is a one. We can then structure a bet in which both expect to win a dollar in every period: Q pays P x if the next element is a one and y (negative) if the next element is a zero where JC and y solve the linear equations for the agents' expectations:
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Applying the law of large numbers, Q believes for sure that P will pay her one on average over the long term, while P thinks there is no chance of this.
Another way to understand this example, and the strength of absolute continuity generally, is in terms of convergent statistics. Absolute continuity says that whenever Q thinks an event is possible, P must agree. Thus any sequence of random variables that converges to some value P -almost everywhere must converge to the same value Q -almost everywhere. In a sense then, P and Q must agree on all P-a.s. convergent "statistics." This is an extremely strict requirement because the entire universe of all conceivable P -convergent statistics is on trial. In this example, the average number of Bernoulli ones, the mean of the sequence, is a P -convergent statistic upon which P and Q disagree.
In this paper we show how the betting approach generalizes to arbitrary probabilities. In effect we show that it is always possible to tailor a convergent statistic to exploit any persistent disagreement between P and Q regarding the continuation of the game. Importantly, the statistic is quite intuitively related to the disagreement to which it was tailored. It is essentially P 's time-average winnings in a non-overlapping sequence of bets made against Q when the two disagree by at least s. Since both players always expect to win each bet, they must both be sure that they will win on average over the long run. The main text constructs bets for the simplest case in which each factor of the sequence space is finite and both P and Q place positive measure on every partial history. An appendix shows that our construction generalizes to countably generated coordinate spaces, such as 9T with the Borel sets.
Before moving forward with our main argument, it is worth pausing to switch to an alternate perspective that helps illustrate the inherent implausibility of absolute continuity and convergence itself. Both the assumption of absolute continuity and the convergence theorem concentrate on the "global" measure that assigns probabilities to an uncountable number of infinite-length histories. It is easier to understand convergence from a "local" perspective.
This entails first viewing histories as paths through an infinite length tree and partial histories as nodes in this tree and next, viewing probabilities on this tree as collections of "local" measures, one for each node. These local measures tell us the probability of each branch emanating from the node. We constructed the priors in our example locally. Since the measures there were i.i.d., all nodes had the same local measure: e.g., (\,j) for P. The local and global perspectives are equivalent (for the measures considered by Blackwell and Dubins 1 ).
Bayes' rule is merely the "isomorphism" that translates the global language of priors into the local language of collections of nodal measures. Once Bayes' rule is seen in this light, its apparent power for generating learning is much diminished.
Indeed, from the local perspective, there is little reason to expect merging of opinions, which would require our two agents come to agree on the likelihood of the current draw.
Speaking informally, suppose we constructed P by randomly assigning a local measure to each node and then repeated the experiment to construct Q . Why would we ever expect the collections of local measures to begin to look the same for nodes far enough out in the tree?
Absolute continuity is thus much more than a mere regularity condition; it imposes a great deal of structure on the priors. Our object in this paper is show how such a seemingly plausible assumption produces such implausible results.
FRAMEWORK
Let each X(i), i = 1,2,... be a finite set. 2 Let X = |"J° X(i) be the set of (full) histories, X n = YY M X(i) the set of (partial) histories (up to n) and X" = J~[* n+ i -*tO • ^ set of continuations (from n). It is helpful to think of X as the set of paths through an infinite tree.
X n would then represent the set of all nodes of rank n, and X" the subtree following each node in X n . We endow each of X, X n , X" with their usual product a -algebras. In particular, write %, S n and S n for the cr-algebras on X, X n and X", respectively. (S n is trivial but it is helpful to have the notation.) We denote the typical partial history as h n eX n .
The partial history of a given full history x is written h n (x), which is just the projection map k.:X->X m .
For any measures R and S on a given measurable space (Y,/t), define the distance
R-S\ = sup A& J\R(A)-S(A)\.
We say that R is absolutely continuous with respect to S ,
Let P and Q be probability measures on X such that 3 P(h n ),Q(h n ) > 0 for all 4 /*". Thus we may define for each history, h n , P 's conditional distribution on the future X" given the past h n , P n (h n ):&" -• 9?, s.t.
P"(/2j(£) = Z ? (jf, l x£|/z M ), for all events £ on Jf\ Define <2"W similarly. In terms of a tree, P"(h n ) and Q"(h n ) are measures on the subtree following node /*" induced by P and 2 • For the convenience of the reader, we restate Blackwell and Dubins' convergence theorem for the special case we are considering.
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Theorem 1 [Blackwell and Dubins' (1962) Standard arguments establish that we lose no generality if, in contradicting convergence, we 1) take s x uniformly over x and 2) take the continuation events on which P and Q disagree to be cylinders. This is stated formally in the following lemma, the proof of which is relegated to an appendix. 
The two components of this lemma correspond to the two conditions that we will require to apply a law of large numbers. The fact that cylinder events resolve in finite time will allow us to construct a sequences of bets which do not overlap in time and are thus uncorrelated.
The uniformity in s allows a uniform bound on the "stakes" of the bets.
DEFINING THE SEQUENCE OF BETS
From the infinite sequence of e -disagreements on cylinders along each path in D, we construct a sequence of uncorrelated zero-sum "bets" each of which P and Q both expect to The construction of these bets requires a fair amount of notation, but is quite intuitive, and can be seen as a three-part generalization of the simple example in the introduction. The first generalization is to bets that are uncorrelated, as opposed to independent. This poses no problem as we can simply apply a different law of large numbers. The second generalization accounts for the fact that infinite s -disagreement occurs only along a subset of paths-this turns out to be just a matter of bookkeeping. The last generalization allows for the possibility that bets take different amounts of time to resolve. To deal with this we convert from calendar time, n, to an event time, k, based on the resolution times of the bets.
We will say that there is a (s-) bet at node h n when P"(h n )-Q"(h n )\ > s. For all nodes
h n that have bets, we arbitrarily select (by the axiom of choice) a cylinder event
| > e and define the bet at node h n to be the following random variable on the continuation: B K :X" -> 9?, s.t.
[2-(p + q), yeC K
where we abbreviate as p = P n {h n )(C hn ) and q = Q n (h n )(C K ). By convention, if there is no bet at h n , we set B K = 0. We chose these two particular values for B h because they imply that the expected value of B K is one under P n {h n ) and is negative one under Q n (h n ).
their (conditional) disagreement about whether C K will occur in the continuation. The realized value of B h is the net payment from Q to P. Suppose, for example, that P thinks C h is at least s more likely than does Q. The bet says that Q pays P the amount ----if C h occurs and "pays" the negative amount ----if not, and each player p-q " p-q expects to win one dollar. Importantly, since \p -q\ > e the stakes of all bets are uniformly bounded across all nodes l n ' B u
We have defined bets at each node where it is possible: next we assemble a sequence of bets so that the bet upon cylinders do not overlap in time. This will guarantee that the sequence of bets is uncorrelated (in a particular sense) so that we can apply a law of large numbers. Define r\(x), the time of the first bet to be the date of the first node along x that has a bet. If there is no bet at any node along JC, we set n^x) -<x>. We now "patch together" the nodal bets described above to obtain the first bet in our constructed sequence. Let c n [x) be the continuation of history x, i.e. the projection of x onto X n . If n^x) = n < oo, set theirs*
Thus, for any history x along which there is some bet, B^x) is the outcome of the first such bet: i.e. the net payment from Q to P. If there is no bet along x, B l (x) = 0.
Recall that we have associated a particular cylinder in the continuation with each node having a bet. As a cylinder this event may be expressed as A^ x X r+X , for some r, where It should be noted that along all histories x in the set D of persistent s -disagreements, as described in Lemma 1, there is a non-degenerate bet for all k. Since there are infinite e disagreements along every history xeD.we can always find yet another point of disagreement after the resolution of the last bet. We do not use all of the infinity of bets along history x\ just a subsequence constructed so that the k-7 th bet is resolved before the A:* bet is made.
APPLYING THE LAW OF LARGE NUMBERS.
We have created a sequence B X ,B 2 ,... of random variables on X where each B k describes the k* bet made between P and Q. The B k 's are not independent, because the bet upon event and its probabilities under P and Q depend on the history to date. However, they are essentially uncorrelated: their expectation (conditional on being non-degenerate) is the same across all histories up to k (one for P and negative one for Q)\ 
. Thus since the &* bet is made after the k-j* bet is resolved and the expectation of the k * bet from when it is made is always the same, the B k are P -uncorrelated:
Similarly, the Bj? are Q -uncorrelated. 6 Further, since for each h n , B h < J the same uniform bound applies to both B k and Bf, for all k. These two conditions, orthogonality and uniform boundedness, are more than enough to apply a law of large numbers 7 (see, e.g. We conclude that Q is not absolutely continuous with respect to P .
NOTES AND EXAMPLES

Countable Intuition in an Uncountable Setting
Perhaps the reason that the absolute continuity assumption has gained such currency in the literature is that it is so plausible in a finite, or even countable setting. Even the stronger assumption that both players regard each state as at least possible seems attractive, since all this rules out is dogmatism. But it would be a mistake to carry this intuition into the necessarily uncountable setting that is relevant here: obviously, in this case some events must receive zero measure.
In the finite case every measure is absolutely continuous with respect to the uniform measure, while this is far from the case in the uncountable setting. The measure built from nodal probabilities of (y,y) in our introductory example, for instance, is the uniform measure on binary sequences. And indeed we used it as an example because it is trivial to find a measure that is not absolutely continuous with respect to it. Thus, the uniform measure, which we think of as so "open-minded" in the finite case is highly "opinionated" in the uncountable setting. In the case of repeated games, the countable restriction is accomplished if players understand that all strategies are drawn from some given countable set. In this case, the resort to countable supports is particularly unpromising. For as Nachbar (1996) shows there is no guarantee that the best responses to any given countable subset will lie in that set.
Countable Restrictions in X
The Grain of Truth.
Kalai and Lehrer support the assumption of absolute continuity with reference to a stronger assumption called the "the grain of truth." In our context this means that P may be written as a convex combination of Q and any other measure on X. (Note that the functional convex combination of two probability measures is as well a probability measure.)
Interpreting Q as the "true" measure on X and P as an observer's beliefs, the observer's beliefs must contain a "grain of truth."
Our objection to this is very closely related to our objection to the countable restriction discussed above. For if there were only a countable number of probability measures under consideration, not assigning at least some small probability to each would seem dogmatic. But when, as here, the number of possible measures on X is uncountable, we run into the same problem as above. In order for the grain of truth criterion to hold, we have to know that the true measure lies within a particular countable subset of the uncountable number of possibilities. This means that we must know a great deal even before observing the first element of the true sequence. We have provided a proof of Blackwell and Dubins' convergence result that demystifies the role of absolute continuity in a way that we believe makes the result less compelling.
Essentially we have provided an interpretation of the lack of absolute continuity in terms of persistent disagreement. Lacking any independent behavioral interpretation, absolute continuity becomes the economic and behavioral equivalent of convergence.
In general, we feel that there is little promise in attempting to derive convergence from "regularity" conditions on priors. A shift to the "local perspective" laid out in the introduction makes clear that convergence simply does not follow from the structure of the problem. We do not conclude from this, however, that the research program started by
Blackwell and Dubins and then continued by Kalai and Lehrer should be abandoned, only that its focus should shift. The most fruitful approach, in our view, would be to recognize that results require genuine, substantive restrictions on beliefs and then propose restrictions that are explicitly grounded in our best understanding of human behavior.
APPENDIX: PROOF OF LEMMA 1
The fact that s may be chosen uniformly follows from standard arguments and the continuity of probability measures. Let D' be the positive Q measure set of infinite histories, x, with an s x and infinitely many n at which we can find a continuation event D" e g" with
Let D } be the subset of D' such that for infinitely many n, we can find a continuation event D n e2" 
t. P(SAA) <e, where SAA = (S-A)v(A-S) .•
APPENDIX: GENERALIZATION TO UNCOUNTABLE COORDINATE SPACES (WITH COUNTABLY GENERATED G -ALGEBRAS)
The logic for the uncountable case is the same as for the finite case analyzed in the body of the paper. The only difficulty is insuring that the constructed bets B k are measurable functions. For the finite case we simply selected a bet at each partial history having one, and from these "nodal bets" we constructed the B k sequence. In the uncountable case, we can still make such a selection, by the axiom of choice. The problem is that the selection must be made in such manner that the bets B k are % -measurable functions. Here we show how this is possible when each coordinate a -algebra is countably generated-as the Borel sets on 9?, 9T , or even SR 00 . given the past; that is, if there exists a function P"(x l ,...,x n )(E) where x,,...,*" ranges over X n and E ranges over & n with the usual three properties: P"(x l ,...,x n )(E) is S nmeasurable for fixed E\ is a probability distribution on (X",g n ) for fixed (x,,...,x w ); and for bounded S -measurable <f> \<P dP = l(l<f(x x ,...,x n ,z n+l ,z n+2 ...) dP"{x x ,...,x n )) dP n ,
As in Blackwell and
where P n is the marginal distribution of P on {X H ,G n ); that is, P n (A) = P(A X X"), for all
Though not all probability spaces are predictive, any probability measure on the Borel Sets with respect to a complete separable measure space will be (See e.g. Ash p. 266, paragraph 2).
Next we restate Blackwell and Dubins' convergence result:
Theorem 2 [Blackwell and Dubins' "Main Theorem "]: Suppose that P is predictive on (X,S) and that Q is absolutely continuous with respect to P. Then for each conditional distribution P n of the future given the past with respect to P, there exists a conditional distribution Q" of the future given the past with respect to Q such that, with the exception of a set of histories (x, ,...,*", x n+l ,...) of Q -probability 0, the distance between P" (x x ,..., x n ) and Q"(x l ,...,x n ) converges to 0 as n converges to oo.
We add an additional assumption to prove a stronger result:
Assumption 1: Each coordinate S(i) i = 1,2,... is countably generated.
Theorem 3: Suppose that P is predictive on (X,&) and that Q is absolutely continuous with respect to P. Then for each conditional distribution P" of the future given the past with respect to P and all conditional distributions Q" of the future given the past with respect to Q, with the exception of a set of histories (x ] ,...,x n ,x n+x ,...) of Q -probability 0, the distance between P n {x x ,...,x n ) and g" (*,,...,*") converges to 0 as n converges to GO.
The assumption that S(i) is countably generated is weaker than it may at first seem: as noted above the Borel sets on 9T , even SR" are countably generated. Thus, generation by a countable collection of sets is a much weaker condition than generation by a countable partition, the assumption imposed by Kalai and Lehrer (1993) in their proof of Blackwell and
Dubins type convergence.
Contradicting Blackwell and Dubins Convergence within a Countable Collection of Continuation Events
Let ?(i) be the smallest algebra containing the countable collection of subsets generating By the same reasoning as in Lemma 1 we obtain the following restatement of nonconvergence: The first step is to define a bet for each time n, partial history x x ,...,x n and each element of 9" on which P and Q disagree by at least s. For each n = 1,2,..., enumerate 9" as 
S(i)
.
{F;}. Set PZ:X->91 s.t. PZ(x) = P H (h H (x)\FZ). Define
A Measurable Selection of Bets for Each Time n
The second step is to select measurably a bet for each partial history. We will arbitrarily choose the first event in our enumeration of ?" for which a bet exists. Thus the random betupon event for n is m n :X -» N u{oo} s.t.
Note that m n (x) = oo if there's no bet at *,,...,*". The random resolution time of the first bet is defined in the same manner as 5,; i.e., x>} s.t.
= r" 1 =
The next two results concern the measurability of the objects defined in this subsection. k=l: Since for all n, \m n < oo} is a S n -measurable set, {n x = n} = {m n < oo} -(J \m n , < oo} is also a S n -measurable set. Thus Lehrer, Andrew Newman, and the associate editor and referees of a previous version. 1 Blackwell and Dubins' restrict attention to probability measures that are fully described by a collection of nodal measures (See the appendix). Conversely, every collection of nodal measures produces a (unique) measure on full paths (See, e.g. Ash (1972) , p. 109).
2 See the appendix for the general case.
3 Here and in the next sentence, we abuse notation in the usual manner by viewing h n as both an element of the partial histories X n and a subset of the full histories X. 4 See the appendix for the general case.
5 See the appendix for the general case.
6 This is shown for the more general case in the appendix. 7 An alternative approach here is to: 1) recognize that, with appropriate choice of filtration, B k is a submartingale difference sequence for P and a supermartingale difference sequence for Q, 2) consider the Doob decompositions (See, e.g. Shiryaev, p. 482) of the corresponding sub-and supermartingales, and 3) apply the martingale law of large numbers (e.g. Shiryaev, p. 501) to the martingale components of these decompositions. Note that this "martingale approach" to our proof does not call upon Doob's martingale convergence result, as do the proofs in Blackwell and Dubins and Kalai and Lehrer. In particular the martingale law of large numbers follows from martingale inequalities. 10 That is to say, S(i) is the smallest a -algebra containing some countable collection of subsets of X(i).
11 Indeed, the value of the portion of Blackwell and Dubins' theorem that is not contained in our own result is unclear: the fact there exists a version of Q" that converges to a given version of P" is difficult to interpret when each S{i) is not countably generated. For when the B(i) are not countably generated, two different pairs of choices P n , Q" and P", Q" may yield distance functions \P n (x v ...,x n )-Q n (x x ,...,x n )\ and \P n (x l ,...,x n )-Q n (x l ,...,x n )\ that differ on a set of both P and Q positive probability. In other words, without countable generation, the distance norm and hence the convergence properties Q and P will not be invariant to our choice of P n and Q n . The question then arises: if given P", some choices of Q" converge to P" and some do not, has there been a "merging of opinions?"
For the discrete a -algebra and so for all a -algebras on Nu {oo} .
